What next for the Palestinians?

In less than three months, the mandate of the president of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), Mahmoud Abbas, legally ends. With the Palestinian Legislative Council frozen since 2006 and the administrations of Salam Fayyad in the West Bank and Ismail Haniyeh in Gaza both lacking democratic legitimacy, his is the last elected position in the PNA.

Without a new ballot before January 9, 2009, Palestinians risk being left without legitimate governing structures, and the international community will not have a partner to continue the hollow "peace process". While the international community and Israel have had a major stake in undermining Palestinian democratic institutions, the question remains: what next for the Palestinian people? In fact, this breakdown may provide an important opening for new popular forces to rise within Palestinian national politics.

To salvage what remains of Palestinian institutions, Egypt is attempting to broker an agreement between Fatah and Hamas. However, the first draft of a possible agreement reflects competing factional interests that render the talks fragile at best. Abbas's mandate topped the preliminary negotiations. Hamas had insisted on the illegality of an extension of his mandate, yet it seemingly backed down in front of Fatah's intransigency.

Neither player in the West Bank PNA is in a position to run an election campaign now. Abbas, with a divided Fatah might lose the ballot, and if Fayyad is planning a candidacy, he still needs time to prepare. Realistically, it seems pointless to stage elections risking a Palestinian vote for a Hamas representative who does not please Israeli and western interests and would be brought down via sanctions and isolation.

Hamas' concession for Abbas to keep his position beyond the electoral mandate only underscores the fact that the PNA is on the verge of institutional breakdown. Politically, Abbas is caught between the returns that Hamas will demand and the divisions within Fatah. An old guard of Fatah officials are gathering around Ahmad Qureia, the chief negotiator of the PNA, calling for the Fayyad government to step down. Their main interest in Cairo is the construction of a new "consensus government" to shore up the power of the dominant parties and sideline Fayyad and his "technocrats". The old guard feel threatened by what they see as Fayyad's attempt to split Fatah or to wrest control from its traditional leadership.

Fayyad is well placed to succeed in this mission. His leverage on the PNA's funding allows him to ensure that Fatah cadres, regional governors and other position holders depend partially on him for salaries and benefits. Further, the current reform of the Palestinian "security sector" eliminates much of the historical military leadership that arose in the diaspora during the 1970s and 1980s and which remains imbued with national values. Instead, new recruits trained by the CIA are taught a different line. As the Palestinian interior minister reportedly stated: "You are not here to confront Israel, the conflict of Israel has until now led nowhere. You must show the Israelis that you can do the job."

This is not the way to gain Palestinian popular support. Even after his almost daily visits to towns across the West Bank during this summer, US protégé Fayyad holds no more sway with the people than does Qureia, whose name is still linked with the company that provided cement for the Wall.

An alliance of Palestinian leftist parties, so far uninvolved in the power play around the PNA, would probably garner popular support by giving priority to the needs of the people and the principles of the Palestinian struggle. Yet they have so far been unable to concretely unite against the politics of factional interests. Until then, they will remain marginal in the national discussions.

Amid the political haggling by leaders without a national vision, the Cairo talks will hardly go beyond the current draft agreement. This might avert an open confrontation between Fatah and Hamas, but it keeps the president's mandate legally questionable and politically unviable. Essentially, it produces committees which will discuss issues considered crucial to the factional interests but with little prospect of reaching conclusions.

In this context, the PLO could be a fallback option. Though the revival of the organisation is on the Cairo agenda, recent efforts do not bode well. The latest attempt, led by Abed Rabbo (the PLO's chair) and Fayyad, was based solely on participation from the West Bank. According to their plans, the PLO would start receiving funds through the PNA, effectively putting the PNA into a dominant position. This would cripple the only Palestinian body representing Palestinians across historic Palestine and in the diaspora, abandoning all to a paralysed PNA.

For the international community, the impending demise of legitimate and viable Palestinian structures of representation signals the end of the Annapolis process. With the US administration in election mode and the Israeli prime minister yet to form her cabinet, it seems unrealistic that the promoters of Annapolis will succeed in coercing Palestinians before the end of Abbas's mandate into signing an agreement that reflects Israeli expectations and as a result will not stop the colonisation, fragmentation and isolation of the West Bank and Gaza. Abbas is not Arafat, who enjoyed trust and respect even without elections because of his role in the struggle and his charisma. Any new US or Israeli administration will lack a Palestinian partner with the legal authority or popular backing to sign such an agreement.

For once, it seems time is on the side of the Palestinians, opening up the opportunity to reorder the ranks and define alternatives to the current political setting. A popular force created to shoulder the national responsibilities could build upon the large majority of Palestinians who have been alienated by the current party politics but are not willing to surrender their struggle. It can create national unity by focusing on the one thing missing from the Cairo talks: the struggle against the occupation and Israel's apartheid system of checkpoints, the Wall and settlements. This can lead out of the current political crisis, regenerate the Palestinian struggle, and create a viable national movement.